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Abstract 
This study investigated the relationship between mood, cognitive style, and implicit learning. 
Ninety-four participants were induced with a positive, neutral, or negative mood. We predicted 
that a positive mood would enhance implicit learning, while a negative mood would depress it. 
Additionally, we expected that participants with a more intuitive cognitive style would perform 
better on implicit learning. Implicit learning was measured using the Artificial Grammar (AG) 
and Serial Reaction Time (SRT) tasks. Our results suggest surprising differences between the 
tasks; positive mood and intuitive cognitive style seem to help the SRT, while negative mood 
and analytical cognitive style seem to help the AG. We postulate that this might result from 
differences in modality, strategy use, or awareness of the pattern. 
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The Effect ofMood and Individual Differences on Implicit Learning 
It might be surprising to learn that, at this very moment, you are consciously aware of 
only a small fraction of the information your mind is processing. The mind controls two distinct 
but intimately intertwined systems: The explicit system and the implicit system (Hogarth, 2001; 
Pacini & Epstein, 1999). The explicit system accounts for deliberate actions that are available to 
conscious awareness; it operates consciously and is relatively slow, analytical, and relatively 
uninfluenced by emotions (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). Reading, studying, and willfully attending to 
something are all examples of actions which are controlled by the explicit system. However, 
given the limited amount of attentional resources available to a person, it is not possible to pay 
attention to everything which could possibly be important in the environment (Hogarth, 2001). 
While busy concentrating attention on certain information via the explicit system, the 
mind is also unconsciously learning associations and processing information from the 
environment. Processes such as these are part of the implicit system; it is preconscious, operates 
quickly or automatically, holistically, and is highly associated with the effects of emotion (Pacini 
& Epstein, 1999). The implicit system operates at a level below conscious awareness and is less 
dependent on attentional resources (Hogarth, 2001). The implicit system is capable ofprocessing 
vast and complex sets of information-so vast and complex, that one could not even attempt to 
attend to all of it consciously (Cleeremans & Jimenez, 1998). Despite being unavailable to 
consciousness, this implicit information can influence actions. For example, implicit learning 
might influence social information processing. When in a social situation, individuals may make 
implicit associations that might lead to hasty judgments of character or stereotyping (Park & 
Banaji, 2000; Seger, 1994). 
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Evidence for the existence of these two distinct systems stems from neuroscientific 
research. For example, some studies have indicated that patients with Korsakoff's syndrome and 
anterograde amnesia still maintain the unconscious processes ofthe implicit system, whereas 
explicit functions are drastically reduced (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987; Roediger, 1990). This 
evidence indicates that implicit and explicit systems for gaining and processing information are 
distinct, as the explicit system can be damaged while the implicit system remains intact. 
Because the environment is so incredibly rich in information, the individual cannot attend 
to all of it. Thus, in order to take in as much of that information as possible, individuals are able 
to learn implicitly, through experience rather than meticulous explicit study. Much of the 
information that is used in everyday life has not been explicitly taught; rather, it has been gained 
over time through experience. An expert tennis player, for instance, learns to react to subtle cues 
in the opponent's movements. The tennis player probably cannot explicate precisely what cues 
she is reacting to, but her behavior on the court is deeply influenced nonetheless. This is the 
phenomenon of implicit learning, or the gaining ofknowledge at a level below consciousness 
(Cleeremans & McClelland, 1991; Roediger, 1990). Because so much ofone's behavior is 
influenced by implicit processes such as implicit learning, it is important to understand what 
affects it, positively and negatively. 
Two possible factors which could influence implicit learning are cognitive style and 
mood. Cognitive style has been demonstrated to influence many aspects of cognition, such as 
problem solving strategy (Epstein, 1994; Pacini & Epstein, 1999). Its relationship to implicit 
learning, however, has thus far been overlooked. Likewise, mood has been shown to influence 
many aspects of cognition, including idea generation, creativity, and information processing 
(e.g., Isen, 1987, 1999; Vosburg, 1998a, 1998b). However, mood's influence on implicit learning 
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has been sorely underinvestigated. Considering the importance of implicit learning in typical 
cognition and mood's widespread effects on cognition, the effect ofmood on implicit learning 
seems to be an obvious and important area of study. This study seeks to fill these gaps in the 
implicit processes literature to provide a more thorough account ofhow individual differences 
and mood impact implicit learning performance. 
What is Implicit Learning? 
According to Berry and Dienes (1993), in implicit learning, "a person typically learns 
about the structure of a fairly complex stimulus environment, without necessarily intending to do 
so, and in such a way that the resulting knowledge is difficult to express" (p. 2). In general, 
implicit learning is learning which is unconscious and results in abstract, tacit knowledge (Reber, 
1989; Seger, 1994). Implicit knowledge generally contains information about complex or hidden 
covariations in the environment (Lewicki, Czyzewska, & Hoffman, 1987; Lewicki, Hill, & 
Czyzewska, 1997, 1992; Seger, 1994). The information is more complex than a simple 
association or frequency count; it must be sufficiently complex and abstracted (Seger, 1994). 
Though psychologists cannot study how expert tennis players detect subtle changes in 
opponents' movement, they can recreate the phenomenon of implicit learning in the lab. For 
example, in the Serial Reaction Time task (SRT), participants are asked to view a dot moving 
among four boxes on a computer screen. Unbeknownst to them, the dot's movements are not 
random, but are governed by a complex probabilistic pattern. Participants unconsciously 
recognize this pattern, and thus are able to make very quick and accurate predictions about where 
the stimulus will appear. At a conscious level, however, participants cannot explicate the pattern; 
in fact, most are not aware that a pattern even exists (Cleeremans & Jimenez, 1998; Reber, 
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1989). The ability of the implicit system to pick up on and utilize complex information is a 
testament to its importance in our everyday cognition. 
As stated previously, implicit learning remains intact even in patients with certain 
cognitive deficits. For example, patients with Korsakoff's syndrome, a disease that impacts 
working memory, and amnesiacs who have lost their ability to form new memories (anterograde 
amnesia) can still implicitly learn about covariations that unconsciously influence their behavior 
(Nissen & Bullemer, 1987; Roediger, 1990). This evidence indicates that implicit and explicit 
systems for gaining and processing information are distinct, as the explicit system can be 
damaged while the implicit system remains intact. 
To study implicit learning, researchers have created many computer-based tasks 
involving complex and subtle patterns. Two common measures of implicit learning are the 
Artificial Grammar task (AG) and Serial Reaction Time task (SRT). The SRT, explained 
previously, involves a complex pattern ofmovement which participants become increasingly 
able to predict. The AG, on the other hand, requires participants to memorize strings of letters 
generated by a complex set of rules and judge whether novel letter strings follow the same rules. 
Though different on the surface, both the AG and SRT require participants to view a 
stimulus environment which they must learn about in order to perform adequately during the 
later testing phase. In addition, the structure of each task is unfamiliar, bearing no resemblance to 
tasks that the participant may know and recognize through previous experience (Reber, 1989). 
These essential points make it possible for psychologists to use these tasks to measure implicit 
knowledge gained independently of conscious or explicit learning strategies. Other researchers 
have developed similar paradigms, such as Berry and Broadbent's (1984) process control tasks, 
which have likewise proven useful in measuring implicit learning. 
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A degree of controversy is present in discussion regarding how similar or dissimilar 
different implicit learning tasks are to each other. The literature comparing various implicit 
learning tasks is small and limited in scope; many researchers focus only on one specific breed of 
implicit learning task (e.g., Cleeremans & Jimenez, 1998; Reber, 1989). However, recent 
research suggests that the different implicit learning tasks may not be as similar as previously 
thought. Gebauer and Mackintosh (2007) found no significant correlations among scores on an 
artificial grammar task, a serial pattern task (similar to the SRT), and a process control task. 
Seger (1994) hypothesizes that because the different implicit learning tasks rely on different 
response modalities, the tasks may differ in underlying mental representation and attentional 
requirements. Thus, it will be important to investigate the relationship between the AG and the 
SRT in this study. 
Evolutionarily, the implicit system is thought to be old and "primitive" (Hogarth, 2001; 
Reber, 1992). According to Reber (1992), consciousness evolved only recently in human history. 
Implicit functions such as implicit learning evolved because they were beneficial to the 
organism; that is, members ofa species who could learn things implicitly performed better in 
their environment than their implicitly-deficient counterparts. In addition, evidence from 
neuroscience suggests that implicit processes such as implicit learning are generally based on 
lower level brain structures, such as the basal ganglia (Lieberman, 2000). Because implicit 
learning is such an evolutionarily old function, many researchers assume that individuals do not 
differ in their ability to learn things implicitly, citing evidence from other evolutionarily old 
processes, such as reflexes and reactions to hormones (Reber, 1992). This theory stands in stark 
contrast to those involving individual differences in explicit processes, such as intelligence and 
cognitive style, in which there is a wide range ofvariability (Hogarth, 2001; Lewicki, 
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Czyzewska, & Hoffman, 1987; Reber, 1992). However, psychologists such as Kaufman (2006) 
and Woolhouse and Bayne (2000) hypothesize that individual differences do exist in implicit 
learning. These researchers point out that many evolutionarily old processes and traits exhibit 
individual differences, including such as height and general athletic ability. In addition, evidence 
from the cognitive style literature hints at the existence of individual differences in implicit 
processes (Kaufman, 2006). 
Cognitive Style and Implicit Processes 
According to dual process theory, people differ in their cognitive style, preferring to use 
either implicit or explicit processes more than the other (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). People with an 
intuitive or "experiential" cognitive style prefer implicit processes, relying on holistic 
information and "gut feelings" to make decisions, whereas people with an analytical or "rational" 
cognitive style prefer explicit processes, breaking problems down into steps and making careful, 
deliberate decisions. According to Pacini and Epstein, preferences for these modes are 
theoretically uncorrelated; an individual may be high on one or both or neither. 
To support their theory of individual differences in implicit processes, many researchers 
cite evidence from the study of intuition and intuitive cognitive style. Intuition, another aspect of 
cognition rooted in the implicit system, can be characterized as a mode of thought that operates 
automatically, subconsciously, and without discrete steps. Epstein (1994), placing intuition in a 
dual-process framework, describes the intuitive system as automatic, holistic, and associative, 
while the analytical system is assumed to be deliberative, rational, and rule-based. The Rational­
Experiential Inventory reflects this dual-process system (REI; Pacini & Epstein, 1999). The 
Rational subscale measures preference for and ability to use analytical processes, whereas the 
Experiential subscale measures preference for and ability to use intuitive processes. The REI is 
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used to compare thought processes among individuals; for example, analytical and intuitive 
cognitive styles correlate with different problem solving strategies (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). 
The literature on intuition and intuitive cognitive style clearly defines intuition as 
differing among individuals (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). Therefore, there is already evidence for 
individual differences in at least this one implicit process. From this, one might expect to find 
individual differences in other implicit processes as well, such as implicit learning. Despite this 
conclusion, little research has related cognitive style to other implicit processes. 
The Effect ofMood on Cognition 
There is a rapidly growing literature about the effect ofmood on cognitive processes. The 
effect ofpositive mood on cognition has been most widely documented: Isen (1999, 1987) found 
that positive mood impacts pro-social behavior, cognitive processes, and motivation. Positive 
mood has also been shown to influence creativity; in particular, it has been found that positive 
mood facilitates creative problem solving (Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987), increases 
uniqueness ofword associations (Isen, Johnson, Metz, & Robinson, 1985), and increases idea 
quantity in divergent thinking tasks (Vosburg, 1998a, 1998b). Estrada, Isen, and Young (1997) 
have shown that positive mood in physicians leads to faster, more integrated diagnoses. 
The findings surrounding the effect ofpositive mood on implicit learning are higWy 
conflicting. According to Isen (2004), positive affect induces careful, thorough thinking and 
problem solving strategies. In addition, Braverman (2006) found that negative mood enhances 
performance on a simple covariation detection task. Although she did not specifically control for 
how implicit or explicit the resulting knowledge was, Braverman found the same results even 
when focusing on those participants who had only implicit knowledge. Based on this research, 
we might expect that a negative mood would enhance implicit learning. 
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However, other researchers have found that positive mood facilitates heuristic use, which 
might suggest the opposite hypothesis-that positive mood enhances implicit learning. 
Heuristics lead to quick, snap-judgment decisions made without deliberation, rather than the 
"careful, thorough thinking" described by Isen. For example, positive mood has been shown to 
increase stereotyping behavior, a judgment based on heuristics (Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Susser, 
1994; Park & Banaji, 2000). Heuristics are closely related to the kind ofprocessing associated 
with intuition (Hogarth, 2001). Thus, ifwe predict that intuitive people should perform better at 
implicit learning, we might also expect people in a positive mood will perform in a similar 
manner because positive mood naturally induces intllitive, heuristic processing. 
Given the contradictory evidence regarding the effect ofmood on cognition, we argue 
that a positive mood will enhance implicit learning. Braverman's (2006) study examined 
performance on an exceedingly simple covariation, rather than the subtle and complex patterns 
exhibited by tasks such as the AG and SRT. Because a broad, holistic cognitive style or strategy 
would be more beneficial in learning these kinds of covert patterns, we believe that a positive 
mood should benefit implicit learning more. 
The effect ofnegative mood on cognition has been the subject of less study, but 
researchers have made important developments. Naismith and colleagues (2006) found that 
clinically depressed patients demonstrated lower performance on implicit learning tasks. This 
finding suggests that people exhibiting a more negative mood might also perform worse on these 
tasks. However, another line of research by Rathus and colleagues (1994) found that anxiety, 
commonly associated with negative mood, negatively impacted explicit, but not implicit, 
learning performance. This would support the hypothesis that implicit processes are robust and 
not influenced by environmental factors such as mood. 
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Some researchers have argued that arousal could be a confounding variable in research 
on mood (Clapham, 2001; Isen et aI., 1987). It is possible that being in a strong mood influences 
behavior, regardless ofwhether the mood is positive or negative. However, based on past 
research, there is little evidence to give credence to this argument. Research using both positive 
and negative mood conditions has found differing effects ofeach condition, suggesting that 
something more than arousal is at work (Bolte et aI., 2003; Rathus et al., 1994). Thus, it is 
important that we measure the relative arousal of the stimuli used to induce mood, but it may not 
be important to control arousal independent ofmood valence. 
The Present Study 
The present study investigated the effect ofmood and individual differences on implicit 
learning. Research is lacking in relating individual differences and mood to implicit processes 
such as implicit learning, and current evidence leads to two conflicting hypotheses. Studying 
both cognitive style and mood in tandem will reveal their possible interaction. In addition, 
because implicit learning has such a deep impact on our everyday cognitive processing, it is 
important to understand its relationship to individual differences and mood. 
To investigate the effects ofmood on implicit learning, we induced mood in experimental 
participants to be positive, negative, or neutral. Past research has shown that even small 
manipulations have a significant effect on mood; a simple manipulation such as giving 
participants a small bag of candy is enough to produce an effective positive mood (Estrada, Isen, 
& Young, 1997; Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987). The mood manipulation we have chosen, a 
slideshow ofpictures from the International Affective Picture System (lAPS), has been 
demonstrated to effectively induce mood in a variety of settings (Smith, Bradley, & Lang, 2006; 
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Smith, Low, Bradley, & Lang, 2006); we predict that these affective pictures will generate a 
significant effect on mood. 
In general, we predicted that people with a positive mood wOllld score higher on the 
implicit learning tasks than those in the neutral control group, and that people with a negative 
mood would score lower on the implicit learning tasks than those in the control group. This 
prediction was based on evidence relating mood to heuristic processing and a widened scope of 
attention. In addition, we predicted that intuitive cognitive style would positively correlate with 
implicit learning, such that the higher people's level of intuitive cognitive style, the better they 
would do on the implicit learning tasks. We also predicted an interaction between cognitive style 
and mood. We expected that participants with a positive mood and an intuitive cognitive style 
type would perform the best on the implicit learning tasks. We expected that participants with a 
negative mood and a non-intuitive cognitive style type would perform the worst on the implicit 
learning tasks. 
Method 
Participants 
Ninety-four general psychology students from Illinois Wesleyan University participated 
in exchange for course credit. They were recruited in their general psychology classes and by 
advertisements on the study participant bulletin board. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 22 
(M=19.18, 8D=1.26). The sample consisted of33 men and 61 women; 87.2% ofthe sample was 
white, 6.4% black, 5.3% Asian, and 1.1% Hispanic. Participants were randomly assigned to a 
mood condition and counterbalanced task order; there were roughly equal numbers of 
participants in each mood condition. 
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Materials 
Implicit learning measures. Two implicit learning measures were chosen for their 
widespread and robust use in similar research: The Artificial Grammar task (AG) and the Serial 
Reaction Time task (SRT). The AG included two phases, the learning phase and the testing 
phase. In the learning phase, participants memorized a series of20 exemplary letter strings 
generated by a finite-state grammar. Each letter string appeared on the computer screen for 3s, 
after which the participant was prompted to reproduce the string by typing it on the keyboard. If 
participants reproduced the letter string correctly, they were so informed and a new letter string 
was presented. If participants made an error, they were asked to try to reproduce the same letter 
string again. All 20 exemplars were presented twice for a total of40 learning trials. In the 
testing phase, participants were informed that the letter strings they had memorized were formed 
according to a complex set of rules and that the following trials would test their knowledge of 
those rules. Participants were presented with 50 letter strings, one at a time, and responded 
either "yes" (by pressing the Y key) or "no" (by pressing the N key) according to their 
immediate judgment ofwhether the letter string conformed to the rules of the grammar. The 
testing stimuli consisted of 25 grammatical letter strings (7 ofwhich will be from the original 
set) and 25 non-grammatical letter strings, which were formed by introducing one or more 
violations into otherwise grammatical letter strings. The entire set was presented twice so that 
100 judgments were made by each participant. Past research (e.g., Manza, Zizak, & Reber, 1998) 
shows that participants generally scored significantly above chance in correctly classifying letter 
strings, yet they were unable to explicate the grammar rules. Learning is determined by how 
many letter strings were correctly classified as following the grammar. The finite state grammar 
and sample letter strings used in this study can been seen in Appendix A. 
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In the SRT, participants saw a stimulus appear at one of several locations on a computer 
screen and were asked to press the button corresponding to each box when the stimulus appeared 
there. Unknown to the participants, the sequence of successive stimuli followed a complex 
repeating sequence. Participants fIrst completed a practice block, followed by six training blocks, 
each consisting of 120 trials. Past research (e.g., Cleeremans & Jimenez, 1998) indicates that 
participants' reaction times decreased significantly for patterned sequences but not for random 
ones, suggesting that participants unconsciously recognized the pattern and used it to their 
advantage. Participants, however, were consciously unaware of the pattern, even when they were 
asked to consciously look for it (Cleeremans & Jimenez 1998). 
At one point in the task, the pattern switches radically, resulting in a sudden jump in 
participants' reaction time. This jump in reaction time suggests that participants are no longer 
able to rely on their implicitly-learned information about the pattern. This task is scored by 
assessing the gain in reaction time when the pattern switches. The probabilistic pattern used in 
this study can be seen in Appendix B. 
Cognitive style measures. The measure of intuitive cognitive style type used was the 
Rational Experiential Inventory (REI; Pacini & Epstein, 1999). The REI consists of40 items, ten 
for each of the four subscales (Rational favorability, Rational ability, Experiential favorability, 
Experiential ability). Favorability refers to preference for that mode of thought, while ability 
indicates a belief in one's personal ability to successfully use that mode. For example, one 
Rational favorability item is, "I prefer complex to simple problems," whereas an Experiential 
favorability item states, "I like to rely on my intuitive impressions." Meanwhile, a Rational 
ability item states, "Using logic usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life," 
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while an Experiential ability item states, "When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on 
my gut feelings." For the complete questionnaire, please see Appendix C. 
At the end of the experimental session, participants were asked to describe if they noticed 
a pattern in the implicit learning tasks as part ofa post-task questionnaire. Demographic 
information was also collected. 
Mood manipulation. To induce a particular mood, photographs from the International 
Affective Picture System were shown to each participant (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997). The 
lAPS has been widely used as a standardized set ofaffective stimuli (e.g., Smith, Bradley, & 
Lang, 2006; Smith, Low, Bradley, & Lang, 2006). Each photo in the stimulus set was 
normatively assessed for dimensions ofpleasure (valence), arousal, and dominance (see Lang et 
aI., 1997). Participants viewed a different set ofpictures according to their experimental 
condition: Participants in the positive mood condition were shown pleasant pictures such as 
smiling families, beautiful nature scenes, and food. The mean valence rating for pictures in this 
category was 7.25, while the mean arousal rating was 4.79. (Both ratings were on a 9-point scale, 
with 1 being unpleasant/not at all arousing and 9 being pleasant/highly arousing.) Participants in 
the negative mood condition saw images ofdrug use, disease, war, and death. The mean valence 
rating for the set ofnegative images was 2.75, while the mean arousal rating was 5.47. 
Participants in the neutral condition were shown mundane pictures, such as everyday objects and 
landscapes. The mean valence rating for this set of images was 5.00, while the mean arousal 
rating was 3.60. These sets ofphotographs were chosen to induce a mood that would last for the 
duration of the experiment, in order to be a successful experimental manipulation without having 
significant lasting effects for the participants. Sample photographs from each of the three 
conditions can be seen in Appendix D. 
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As a maniplLlation check, participants completed the Positive Affect Negative Affect 
Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) following the mood induction procedure. The 
PANAS is a mood scale consisting of20 words (10 positive, 10 negative) which describe 
different feelings and emotions. Participants were instructed to rate each word on a scale of 1 to 
5 (1 being very slightly or not at all, 5 being extremely) to indicate the extent to which they felt 
that emotion at the moment. For the complete PANAS questionnaire, please refer to Appendix E. 
Procedure 
The cognitive style and implicit learning measures were computer-administered, while 
the PANAS, demographics and post-task questionnaires were paper-based. Participants were 
tested individually in small rooms seated at a computer. Participants completed the REI and 
MBTI, which were counterbalanced to control for effects oforder. Then, participants were 
shown a series of 50 affective photos from the lAPS according to their experimental condition. 
Each photograph was displayed for 5s, with at 1.5s pause between each one. The mood induction 
procedure took approximately 5 minutes. After the mood induction procedure was complete, 
participants were given the mood checklist as a manipulation check. Participants then completed 
both the AG and SRT, which were also counterbalanced. Participants then completed the mood 
checklist once more to check for the lasting effect of the mood manipulation; afterward, they 
completed a post-task questionnaire asking if they could explicate the patterns presented in the 
implicit learning tasks. Participants also completed a brief demographic questionnaire. To reduce 
any negative effects of the mood induction, all participants viewed the 20 most positive, 
photographs from the lAPS at the end ofthe session. The entire testing session lasted 
approximately 45 minutes. 
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Results 
Reliability Analyses 
The Experiential and Rational subscales of the REI were found to be internally reliable 
(a=.79, a =.78). The positive and negative subscales of the PANAS were also found to be 
internally reliable (a =.87, a =.92). 
Manipulation Check 
Two one-way ANOVAs were performed to test the effect of the mood manipulation. The 
analysis yielded significant effects ofmood condition for both the positive and negative 
subscales of the PANAS, respectively, F(2, 91) = 7.97,p<.01; F(2, 91 )= 67.99, p< .01 (For 
means, see Table 1). A Scheffe post-hoc test revealed that the positive mood condition scored 
significantly higher on the positive PANAS subscale than the negative and neutral conditions (p 
< .01;p < .01), while the negative mood condition scored significantly higher on the negative 
PANAS subscale than the positive and neutral conditions (p < .01;p < .01). 
Correlations 
Correlations were performed among the cognitive style measures and implicit learning 
tasks to examine the general relationships among them (see Table 2). We expected that intuitive 
cognitive style would correlate positively with implicit learning scores. As seen in Table 2, the 
SRT did not correlate significantly with any intuitive or analytical cognitive style measures. The 
AG also did not correlate with any intuitive cognitive style measures. However, the AG 
correlated moderately with the REI Rational ability subscale (r = .32,p < .01); a weak, positive 
correlation with the REI Rational favorability subscale was also found (r = .22,p = .04). 
Contrary to our initial hypotheses, this indicates that more analytical participants performed 
better on the AG. 
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In addition, we found that the AG and SRT correlated only weakly, r = .19, P = .09. This 
suggests that the two measures are not measuring the same construct. 
Factorial ANOVAs 
To test the remaining hypotheses, two 2 (high-intuitivelhigh-analytical, low-intuitive/ 
low-analytical) x 3 (positive mood, neutral mood, negative mood) factorial ANDVAs were 
performed. We ftrst performed median splits of the sample to create high-intuitivellow-intuitive 
and high-analyticaillow-analytical groups. Median splits were performed to maintain a 
reasonable number ofparticipants in each group. For the purposes of this study, results with a 
signiftcance level ofp<.1 0 were interpreted due to the rather small number ofparticipants (N;;:: 
15 per cell); we expect that, if we collected data from more participants, these marginal ftndings 
would become signiftcant. Means for each ANDVA can be found in tables 3-6. 
Implicit learning and mood: Main effects. For the SRT, no signiftcant effect ofmood was 
found, F(2, 93) = 1.14,p = .33. Meanwhile, for the AG, we found a signiftcant effect ofmood, 
F(2, 81) = 4.26,p = .02. A Scheffe post-hoc test revealed that participants in negative condition 
scored signiftcantly higher on the AG than participants in the neutral condition. These ftndings 
contradicted our hypothesis that people in a positive mood would perform better on the implicit 
learning tasks. 
Implicit learning and cognitive style: Main effects. The analysis yielded a signiftcant 
main effect of intuitive cognitive style, showing that high-intuition participants performed better 
than low-intuitive participants on the SRT, F(1, 93) = 4.07,p < .05. This ftnding supported our 
hypothesis that more intuitive people would perform better on implicit learning than less 
intuitive people. No main effect of intuitive cognitive style was found for AG, F(1, 81) = 1.49, 
p=.23. 
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Based on the correlational fmding between the AG and REI Rational subscales, we 
repeated the cognitive style analyses with high-analytical and low-analytical groups. For the 
SRT, no significant main effect ofanalytical cognitive style was found, F(I, 93) = .02,p = .90. 
For the AG, however, the high-analytical group performed marginally better than the low­
analytical group, F(I, 81) = 3.32,p = .07. 
Implicit learning, mood, and cognitive style: Interaction effects. For the SRT, a marginal 
interaction effect between mood and intuitive cognitive style was found, F(2, 93) = 2.88, p = .06 
(see Figure 1). A simple effects analysis for intuitive cognitive style yielded a significant effect 
of intuitive cognitive style for the positive mood condition, demonstrating that more intuitive 
people in a positive mood performed better than less intuitive people in a positive mood, F(I, 93) 
=9.58,p < .01 (See Figure 1). This finding explained the significant interaction effect between 
mood condition and intuitive cognitive style and supported our hypothesis that intuitive people in 
a positive mood would perform the best. A second simple effects analysis for mood yielded a 
marginal effect ofmood for the high-intuition group only, suggesting that the effect ofmood on 
SRT performance was mediated by level of intuitive cognitive style, F(2, 93) = 2.77,p = .07. No 
interaction effect was found between mood and intuitive cognitive style for the AG, F(2, 81) = 
1.56,p = .22. 
Meanwhile, no interaction effect was found between mood and analytical cognitive style 
for the SRT, F(2, 93) = .Ol,p = .99. For the AG, the analysis revealed a marginal interaction 
effect, F(2, 81) = 2.45,p = .09. A simple effects analysis revealed a significant effect ofmood 
for the low-analytical group, indicating that low-analytical group members in a negative mood 
performed better on the AG than low-analytical group members in a positive or neutral mood, 
F(2, 81) = 5.22,p < .01 (see Figure 2). Pairwise comparisons revealed that, for the low analytical 
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group only, the positive condition differs significantly from the negative condition (p < .01).and 
the negative condition differs significantly from the positive and neutral conditions (p < .01,p < 
.01). 
Discussion 
Interestingly, the pattern of results differed between the two implicit learning tasks. For 
the SRT, we found an interaction effect between mood and intuitive cognitive style such that 
more intuitive people in a positive mood did better on the SRT. Though we found no main effect 
ofmood, this interaction effect qualified the main effect; high-intuition participants showed the 
predicted effect ofmood. In studying our results of the main effect of intuitive cognitive style, 
we must again interpret this effect in context ofthe interaction; more intuitive people in the 
negative and neutral conditions did not actually learn more than less intuitive people in those 
conditions; the interaction between positive mood and highly intuitive cognitive style gave rise 
to the large effect. 
Our findings for the SRT lended support to our hypotheses; more intuitive people learned 
more implicitly on the SRT, and more intuitive people in a positive mood seemed to learn the 
most. As discussed previously, we believe this is due to the holistic, heuristic processing 
supported by an intuitive cognitive style and positive mood (Bodenhausen et al., 1994; Park & 
Banaji, 2000). This kind ofprocessing might have helped participants take in more ofthe 
complex and subtle pattern of the SRT. 
The results for the AG, however, look quite different. We found, contradictory to our 
hypothesis, that negative mood enhanced performance for the AG. In addition, we found a 
marginal interaction effect demonstrating that less analytical participants seemed to perform well 
on the AG only if they were in a negative mood, whereas highly analytical participants seemed 
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to perform well regardless ofwhat mood they were in. What might explain these unexpected 
effects? 
Past research shows that a negative mood narrows one's scope ofattention and leads to 
more careful, deliberate thirlking (Ansberg & Hill, 2003). Thus, perhaps a narrow scope of 
attention and careful, analytical thinking benefited AG performance because the task was not 
truly implicit. It is possible that explicit knowledge of small aspects of the pattern, as 
demonstrated by the post-task questionnaires, was more beneficial than the holistic knowledge 
gained implicitly. 
Another possible explanation for our fmdings for the AG is that participants might have 
been actively engaging in a form ofhypothesis testing. If some aspect about the AG induced 
analytical thought, and participants consciously recognized part of the pattern, they may have 
begun to concentrate on that part that they recognized, consciously looking for it in each letter 
string to "test" the hypothesis that it was part of the pattern. In doing so, participants might have 
focused so narrowly that they ignored the rest of the letter string, which contained more 
information about the AG's pattern that they might not have been learning consciously. 
According to Seger (1994), true implicit learning must be incidental and not the product of 
hypothesis testing, though some verbal knowledge of the pattern gained from "just noticing" 
would not necessarily preclude categorizing the process as implicit learning. If the participants 
were, in fact, engaging in hypothesis testing, this might account for the apparent differences 
between the AG and SRT. Future research in this area could manipulate the instructions of the 
AG, instructing some participants to consciously look for the pattern and engage in hypothesis 
testing, and instructing others to refrain from any conscious problem solving activity and to 
simply take in the letter strings holistically and passively. 
The Effect ofMood 22 
Despite these claims, it is possible that the pattern of the AG is not simply implicit to the 
participants. The implicit nature of the AG has been somewhat disputed in the literature (Berry, 
1998; Seger, 1994). Seger (1994) notes that knowledge of implicit learning tasks such as the AG 
is often instantiated, meaning that participants can often verbalize surface features of the pattern. 
In looking at the answers to our post-task questionnaires, we found that the majority of 
participants seemed to have explicit knowledge of at least some aspect of the AG's pattern, but 
few participants seemed to have any knowledge of the SRT's pattern. Though participants' 
instantiated knowledge does not necessarily indicate a lack of abstract, implicit knowledge about 
the pattern, the degree to which participants could explicate the pattern might raise concern over 
the validity of the AG's reported implicitness. This debate is certainly present in the literature, 
and future research might investigate the validity of tasks which result in instantiated knowledge. 
In understanding what affects the AG, we may clarify the interesting finding that non­
analytical participants only seemed to perform well if they were in a negative mood. A negative 
mood narrows one's scope of attention and leads to careful, analytic processing (Ansberg & Hill, 
2003, Isen et aI., 1985); in order to perform well on the AG-that is, to have a narrow attention 
and use careful, analytical thinking-perhaps participants whose cognitive style was not 
naturally analytic were able to compensate by having a mood that mimicked the same effects. 
Our findings for the SRT contradict those of researchers such as Braverman (2006), who 
found that a negative mood enhanced detection of covariation. However, our findings for the AG 
lend support to Braverman's results. Like Braverman's covariation task, the AG seemed to result 
in a degree ofexplicit knowledge of the pattern. Thus, perhaps a negative mood enhances tasks 
involving explicit information while a positive mood enhances tasks involving implicit 
information. 
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The current pattern of results lends some support to previous research that has found that 
different implicit learning tasks bear little relationship to each other (Gebauer & Mackintosh, 
2007). We found that the AG and SRT did not highly correlate with each other (r = .190,p = 
.092). Both tasks purportedly measure the same type of implicit learning, yet the fact that they 
did not correlate in this sample suggests that they may measure different things or rely on 
different mechanisms. This rmding is very important in light of the current controversy over the 
similarities of various implicit learning measures. One possible explanation for the difference 
between these tasks is that they seem to rely on different modalities, as suggested by Seger 
(1994). The SRT is sequential and heavily relies on motor and visual skills. The AG, meanwhile, 
involves verbal or language processing as well as a heavy focus on memorization; perhaps the 
AG's reliance on memory makes it more akin to an explicit task. In addition, it is possible that 
implicit learning is not a unitary construct, but is actually a group of related but dissociable 
processes which respond differently to the same situations (Seger, 1994). Further research on 
implicit learning should examine the relative similarities and differences between these two tasks 
to explain these disparate findings. 
An important result of this study was the significant effect of the self-reported REI on 
behavior. Previous research has found many difficulties with self-report measures, either because 
people are not accurate in their self-perception of skills and traits or because these measures 
simply do not predict behavior. The fact that we found significant results using a self-report 
measure of cognitive style replicates the construct validity ofthe REI found by Pacini and 
Epstein (1999) and provides validation of the use of the REI as a predictor ofbehavior. 
A possible concern about the design of this study was that the effect of arousal rather than 
mood valence may have confounded the results.I It is true that the positive and negative mood 
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conditions were significantly more arousing than the neutral mood condition. We found no such 
concern supported for the AG, but the results for the SRT might suggest an effect of arousal. We 
found no main effect ofmood on SRT; the negative and positive conditions performed equally. 
One possible explanation for this finding is that arousal might be more important than mood 
valence for this task, so the more arousing conditions performed better than the less-arousing 
neutral condition. The fact that this pattern was not found for the AG suggests that arousal may 
be important in implicit processing, but not explicit processing. This important implication 
requires further research manipulating the effects of arousal versus those ofmood. 
The results of this study hold implications for everyday implicit learning. The theory that 
a negative mood enhances explicit problem solving because it focuses attention and induces 
analytical processing might imply that students should put themselves in a somewhat negative 
mood before a test that requires focus, such as a mathematics exam. This would be particularly 
important for students who are not analytical by nature. In situations where implicit learning is 
very important due to subtle and complex changes in the environment, such as learning a new 
musical instrument or becoming an expert athlete (such as the earlier tennis player example), a 
person might learn more efficiently when in a positive mood. One might also be more aware of 
how mood might accidentally influence behavior; following an upsetting event, one may not 
notice subtle but important changes in work or school related tasks because of the resulting 
negative mood. By knowing how mood influences behavior, people might be able to better 
predict when their work will be influenced and be able to take proper steps to ensure they are in 
the mood that will benefit them the most. 
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Table 1 
Mean PANAS Scores for Manipulation Check 
PANAS Subscale 
Mood Condition Positive (M, SD) Negative (M, SD) 
Positive 27.09 (7.90) 11.47 (1.74) 
Neutral 20.91 (6.38) 13.25 (3.24) 
Negative 20.93 (6.94) 25.23 (8.05) 
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Table 2 
Correlations Among Implicit Learning Tasks and Intuitive/Analytical Cognitive Style Subscales 
I 
1. REI Rational ability -
1 2 3 4 5 6 
2. REI Rational favorability .49** 
-
3. REI Experiential ability .16 -.13 -
4. REI Experiential favorability -.24* -.19 .50** -
5. SRT .15 .15 .04 -.02 -
6.AG .32** .22* .05 .01 .19 -
Note: ** indicates a correlation significant at the .01 level. * indicates a correlation significant at 
the .05 level. 
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Table 3 
Mean SRT Scores for High- and Low-Intuition Groups by Mood Condition 
Intuition Group 
Mood Condition High-Intuitive (M, SD; N = 49) Low-Intuitive (M, SD; N = 44) 
Positive 38.06 (24.61) 11.07 (24.44) 
Neutral 18.82 (25.24) 14.07 (28.98) 
Negative 23.69 (24.39) 24.93 (15.02) 
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Table 4 
Mean AG Scores for High- and Low-Intuition Groups by Mood Condition 
Intuition Group 
Mood Condition High-Intuitive (M, SD; N = 49) Low-Intuitive (M, SD; N = 44) 
Positive 62.54 (9.85) 58.79 (6.50) 
Neutral 58.08 (5.62) 59.93 (5.86) 
Negative 65.79 (4.02) 62.39 (6.04) 
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Table 5 
Mean SRT Scores for High- and Low-Analytical Groups by Mood Condition 
Analytical Group 
Mood Condition High-Analytical (M, SD; N = 49) Low-Analytical (M, SD; N = 44) 
Positive 25.71 (17.01) 24.14 (37.67) 
Neutral 16.79 (17.26) 16.44 (32.77) 
Negative 24.33 (19.27) 24.17 (22.48) 
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Table 6 
Mean AG Scores for High- and Low-Rationality Groups by Mood Condition 
Analytical Group 
Mood Condition High-Analytical (M, SD; N = 43) Low-Analytical (M, SD; N = 38) 
Positive 63.53 (6.31) 56.92 (9.34) 
Neutral 60.33 (4.91) 58.00 (6.26) 
Negative 63.69 (4.88) 64.82 (6.00) 
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Figure 1 
Interaction between Mood Condition and Intuitive Cognitive Style for the SRT 
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Figure 2
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Appendix A: Finite-State Grammar of Artificial Grammar task (AG) 
The finite-state grammar used in the current study. The grammar generates letter strings by 
following the arrows from the input state (sl) to the terminal state (s6). Several examples of 
"well-formed" strings are presented along with examples of strings that violate the grammar 
(examples taken from Litman & Reber, 2005). 
x 
T 
x v 
p 
v 
I----------~ S5 
V 
Well-Formed Strings 
PVPXVPS 
TSSXXVPS 
TSXS 
PTVPXVV 
PTTTVV 
PVPXVPXVV 
Strings with a single-letter violation 
PTTVVPS 
TXXTXPS 
TSSXV 
VTTVV 
TSSTVV 
PTTTVPV 
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Appendix B: Serial Reaction Time task (SRT) 
Representation of the strategy used for the SRT probabilistic version. Thick lines represent more 
probable transitions (.85) whereas thin lines represent less probable ones (.15). Only a partial set 
of these transitions is represented, to illustrate that both series are communicated precisely at 
those points in which they share a context: After 1-2, the most probable successor is 1 (upper 
row) but in 15 % of the cases the next element could be 4 (bottom row). 
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Appendix C: Rational-Experiential Inventory 
Please rate the following statements about your feelings, beliefs, and behaviors using the scale 
below. Write the number corresponding to your response on the line before each statement. 
1 2 3 4 5
 
Definitely false Mostly false Undecided Mostly true Definitely true
 
__ 1. I'm not that good at figuring out complicated problems. 
__ 2. If! were to rely on my gut feelings, I would often make mistakes. 
__ 3. I prefer complex to simple problems. 
__ 4. I generally don't depend on my feelings to help me make decisions. 
__ 5. I have no problem in thinking things through clearly. 
__ 6. When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my gut feelings. 
__ 7. Thinking is not my idea ofan enjoyable activity. 
__ 8. I like to rely on my intuitive impressions. 
__ 9. I am not a very analytical thinker. 
__ 10. I believe in trusting my hunches. 
__ 11. I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking. 
__ 12. I think it is foolish to make important decisions based on feelings. 
__ 13. I suspect my hunches are inaccurate as often as they are accurate. 
__ 14. I usually have clear, explainable reasons for my decisions. 
__ 15. Knowing the answer without having to understand the reasoning behind it is good 
enough for me. 
__ 16. I would not want to depend on anyone who described himself or herself as intuitive. 
__ 17. Using logic usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life. 
__ 18. I enjoy intellectual challenges. 
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__ 19. I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong, even if! can't explain how I know. 
__ 20. I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of action. 
__ 21. My snap judgments are probably not as good as most people's. 
__ 22. Reasoning things out carefully is not one ofmy strong points. 
__ 23. I don't like situations in which I have to rely on intuition. 
__ 24. I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something. 
__ 25. I trust my initial feelings about people. 
__ 26. I have a logical mind. 
__ 27. I don't think it is a good idea to rely on one's intuition for important decisions. 
__ 28. I don't like to have to do a lot of thinking. 
__ 29. I don't have a very good sense of intuition. 
__ 30. I am not very good in solving problems that require careful logical analysis. 
__ 31. I think there are times when one should rely on one's intuition. 
__ 32. I enjoy thinking in abstract terms. 
__ 33. Using my "gut feelings" usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life. 
__ 34. I don't reason well under pressure. 
__ 35. I tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions. 
__ 36. Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives me little satisfaction. 
__ 37. I hardly ever go wrong when I listen to my deepest "gut feelings" to find an answer. 
__ 38. I am much better at figuring things out logically than most people. 
__ 39. Intuition can be a very useful way to solve problems. 
__ 40. Learning new ways to think would be very appealing to me. 
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Appendix D: Sample Photographs from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS) 
Negative mood condition 
Neutral mood condition 
Positive mood condition 
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Appendix E: Positive and Negative Affect Scale 
This scale consists of a number ofwords that describe different feelings and emotions. Read 
each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to what 
extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment. Use the following scale to 
record your answers: 
1 2 3 4 5 
very slightly a little moderately quite a bit extremely 
or not at all 
interested irritable 
distressed alert 
excited ashamed 
_upset _inspired 
_strong nervous 
_guilty determined 
scared attentive 
hostile _jittery 
enthusiastic active 
_proud afraid 
